TO SAVE LIVES

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

A PUBLICATION FROM THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME CONTROLING DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

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The First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations was held in Doorwerth (near Arnhem), the Netherlands, on November 24th-25th, 1998

A pre-conference meeting of scientists and behavioral experts on November 23rd preceded the conference.

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INTRODUCTION

Peter IJzerman

It was encouraging to see participants from most European countries – and even some non-European countries – gathered together to attend the first European Conference on Hostage Negotiations.

An important conference, I think. During my career in the Dutch police I have been involved in the handling of hostage situations as well and have had the opportunity to experience the positive impact of negotiation and communication in potentially explosive situations such as hostage incidents. It is good to see that European law enforcement professionals increasingly rely on negotiation as a peaceful alternative to tactical assault for hostage taking in a broad range of situations including terrorists attacks, domestic crises, suicide attempts, criminal kidnaps, and prison revolts.

Most countries independently founded their own negotiation strategy. This first large-scale international gathering of experts opened ways to exchange information and to learn from one another. This alone would justify a conference like this. But there is more.

Recent developments urge the need for interstate co-operation and for establishing more formal collaborative relations. What are these developments?

Firstly, countries encounter an increasing number of cross-border incidents, partly because it is more and more easy to freely move throughout the European Community. To handle these incidents efficiently, law enforcement professionals need to know which practices are employed in neighbouring countries and how to co-ordinate joint actions.

Secondly, Europe is rapidly growing more culturally diverse and we have to increase our understanding how to negotiate effectively with individuals from culturally different backgrounds. Law enforcement professionals from countries with different cultural heritages and composed of different cultural or ethnic groups may provide crucial information to one another.

These developments urge the need for international co-operation and for establishing more formal collaborative relations, which may benefit all those involved.

The conference had four main objectives:

1. to map and understand similarities and differences concerning hostage incidents and their management in different countries, especially with regard to legislation and operational procedures;
2. to identify joint training needs for law enforcement personnel involved in hostage incidents;
3. to improve law-enforcement co-operation between Member States of the European Union, especially in cross-border incidents;
4. to discuss innovating approaches to the management of hostage incidents

To achieve these objectives would mean a huge step forward.
The fact that so many professionals gathered to attend the conference was already the first success. I am especially proud that this conference is the result of the co-operation between:
- a police force: the Metropolitan Police, who have so much expertise in this area;
- a training institute, the Police Institute Public order and Safety, which is part of the LSOP; and
- a research group from the university of Groningen, with a lot of expertise in negotiation and communication research.

The fact that research is incorporated is in line with developments within the LSOP, the Dutch Police Education and Knowledge Centre. We have come to realise more and more that in order to be able to professionalise law enforcement, we need to make more and better use of research based insights. The conference has brought together a unique blend of practitioners and scientists and I am pleased that areas where additional research might be needed have been identified. I will gladly support initiatives to start promising research projects.

I would like to thank everyone who made this important event possible, not in the least the European Union. I thank all for their presence and active involvement in the conference. I trust that the contacts made during the conference will result in improved international co-operation. And I will be curious to know when and where the second European Conference on Hostage Negotiations will be held.

TO SAVE THE LIVES OF HOSTAGES

David Veness

The mission statement of hostage negotiation may be simply stated as 'To save the lives of the hostages'. The short history of this statement of mission can be traced to events in the early years of the 1970's. In the terrorist category - the key events at the international level were:

1. The attack upon the Munich Olympics in September 1972 and the subsequent tragic events at Fürstenfeldbrück airport and
2. The attack upon the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in December 1975. (The attack in Vienna and the subsequent escape was led by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez also known as Carlos the Jackal.)

However, whilst Munich and Vienna occupy a particular category of significance because of the impetus they provided internationally to the need to generate counter-terrorist response, it is appropriate to recall other relevant events which occurred at this period including aircraft hijacking notably the events at Dawson's field in Jordan in September 1970, the kidnapping of politicians, businessmen and diplomats and the seizure of embassies including the German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975. In Holland there was the occupation of the French Embassy in Den Haag by the Japanese Red Army in September 1974 and the Moluccan train sieges in December 1975 and May 1977. In England there was a criminal siege at the Spaghetti house restaurant in Knightsbridge in September 1975 followed a few weeks later by the Balcombe Street siege involving the PIRA in December 1975. In New York the NYPD had reacted to events at Munich by developing negotiation techniques.

Interestingly the New York reaction was also based upon the reality that a quicker police response to *criminal* events – such as bank robberies – whereby armed police officers arrived more speedily at the scene and confronted armed criminals - resulted in many more cases where the armed criminal took hostages, who were themselves innocent victims and by-standers. The New York response techniques were devised by Simon Eisendorfer (a Police Inspector) assisted by Harvey Schlossberg and implemented by Captain Frank Bolz who was the first commander of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team. I had the great privilege of working With Frank Bolz in New York immediately before his retirement in the early 1980's - he described the police philosophy *before* the development of negotiation as 'Kicking down the door and blowing the turkey away.' This was replaced by containment and negotiation to preserve the life of the hostage. The US contribution to negotiation philosophy was reinforced by the

involvement of the FBI and the creation of the special ops and research unit (SOARU) at the FBI Academy at Quantico, VA. The Unit Chief Conrad Hassell led a team who developed the vital inter-face between police and academic disciplines.

In Stockholm, Sweden in August 1973 there was a famous bank siege which gave its name to a much-debated syndrome concerning the relationship between hostages and their captors. Elsewhere in Europe there were many similar incidents of hostage taking involving hostage-takers who were terrorist, criminals or mentally unbalanced offenders. In many European countries the practical art of hostage negotiation became an important policing technique and training courses evolved to develop the skills of selected officers.
The course I know best is that which was devised by Scotland Yard and which began in 1976. The Scotland Yard course drew heavily on Dutch experience (and the work of Dr Richard Mulder) and the work on criminal cases in the United States led by New York and the FBI. That course has been conducted 3 to 4 times every year since 1976 and one of the keys to its development has been support from academic research and medical expertise from eminent psychiatrists and psychologists. The next Scotland Yard course will be the 80th. training programme in its unbroken series.

The developing method

The methodology may be very simply described as: isolation, evacuation and negotiation or in one word containment. The intention of the methodology is to achieve stability and safety. Thus the scene is isolated to reduce further risk of more hostages. Those who are in immediate danger because of proximity are evacuated. And then a process of negotiation unfolds with the intention of saving the lives of the hostages. The preferred outcome of the negotiating approach is release of the hostages and surrender of the hostage-takers.

If that cannot be achieved a policy of playing it long is generally regarded as conducive to intelligence gathering, which adds to chances of successful rescue. An overt hostage-taking incident is unusual in law enforcement terms: preservation of life, prevention of crime and investigation of crime are strands *all* occurring at the same time. Hostage incidents can be described as a 'crime in action' or a 'frozen frame felony'

Experience indicates that passage of time is *valuable*. It:
- increases basic human needs
- reduces anxiety
- increases rationality
- allows better command decisions. In a phrase: 'time makes bosses brighter'

But the passage of time also has negative aspects:
- tiredness
- emotional unpredictability
- temptation to take positive action
- publicity
- increased expectation of assault

Methodology has evolved to address a range of predictable practical problems:
- responding to demands
- coping with deadlines
- improving the changes of releases
- medical issues
- intermediaries
- working with interpreters
- exchange of hostages
- media dimensions

Methodology is based upon *teamwork*. Most countries avoid reliance on one negotiator and prefer a team concept supported by a co-ordinator or coach. Experience has demonstrated the importance of selection of team members - people who are:
- team operators not prima donnas
- 'people persons'
- not reliant on rank
- ready to learn and keep on learning
- equipped with a sense of humour

One very important aspect of *teamwork* is that Negotiating team members should be distinct from overall command. The rule is that commanders command and negotiators negotiate. Incidents that have gone wrong over the years have often featured on overlap between the command function and the negotiating role. Both jobs require concentration on the task in hand – above all the role of incident commander requires an objective perspective informed by all the components of crisis management. It logically follows that the methodology of hostage negotiation that I have briefly described is important but cannot operate in isolation from an

overall strategy of crisis management. If crisis management is to be successful – especially in a world where the challenges of cross-border incidents and cultural diversity are growing (see IJzerman, this volume) we need to approach the future with imagination and flexibility.

In strategic terms: crisis management operates in context of government policy and planning. Before the event we look to our governments to define planning parameters – ideally:
- a determination to avoid concessions
- a commitment to 'playing it long'
- a willingness to use force where appropriate but only when it is the last resort
- definition of roles
- commitment of resources and to demonstrate support for:
  - contingency planning
  - training/exercising
  - research

During an event we expect from our governments:
- adherence to policy
- no confusion of operational decision-making

Effective crisis management relies upon multidisciplinary, multi-agency and multi-national partnership. One of the great benefits of the experience of evolving negotiating strategy has been the partnership of disciplines – especially psychiatry and psychology and medical science. These specific disciplines have proved to be especially powerful in developing an effective research base on which to advance techniques. Psychiatrists and psychologists have also played a vital operational role – normally as *advisers* for the *overall* incident.

A *multi-agency* partnership is essential in almost every jurisdiction in order that the respective and complementary talents and skills of all relevant agencies are utilised to best effect. This is normally assisted by prior rehearsal – but training courses and conferences also enhance the effectiveness of inter-agency operations – especially between public/private sectors. If the objective is to preserve life and pursue the terrorist it is vital that energy is not wasted in inter-agency tension and misunderstanding.

A multi- *national* partnership is now almost an inevitable feature of hostage-taking cases. Almost every hostage taking involves international aspects. Almost all hijackings (planes, boats and trains) involve hostages of more than one nationality. And in *covert* hostage taking or kidnapping the circumstances in which negotiators

work together are now commonplace. There is no doubt the kidnap of European nationals overseas is on the increase and we can predict that the need for multi-national operations will grow commensurately. This makes the need for understanding of respective national management structures, legal frameworks and operating procedures absolutely critical. It is too late to understand each other when we begin to work together on a live case with human lives at real risk.

International co-operation

It is a fact of modern serious crime investigation that serious crime is almost invariably international - at the very least there is an overseas element.

The systems of co-operation formalised through Interpol, Europol and Schengen are now *routine* part of investigative activity and absorb an increasing component of the daily lives of police chiefs and senior investigators. The international law enforcement and security structures and organisation provide a powerful platform to make co-operation happen. But the *structural* approach needs to be supplemented by two additional dimensions.

The first is bilateral co-operation, which often arises on the basis of a common concern and thus an operational imperative. The second is international co-operation at the practitioner not policy level. The First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations is to be welcomed as a bonus for that need. I would hope that one outcome of this conference could be a working group of practitioners – perhaps the heads of national hostage/kidnap units – who might meet on a non-political basis to discuss operational experience and developing response methods. I would be pleased to offer the support of Scotland Yard for such an initiative.

What of the future / What are possibilities we need to anticipate?

May I conclude my paper by suggesting two issues of concern:

1. Enhanced communications
The departments of modern information technology represent a very significant challenge to the negotiating concept of *isolation.* Indeed that concept may be increasingly elusive in the mobile telephone era. Modern communications also affect how we will negotiate with hijackers on planes and ships. This is a fruitful area for further research to address a real operational problem.

2. Changing patterns of national/international terror

Finally let me look at *terrorist trends* and their implication for hostage negotiation. Xavier Raufer – the Parisian based criminologist reminds us that – *terrorism has changed more since 1990 since it emerged in modern form in 1968*. For us in law enforcement the key developments relate to the suspects – the means – the methods and the opportunities. The suspect list has grown and changed. In personality terms this is the shift from Carlos The Jackal to Osama Bin Laden. The key development is that amateur terrorists, criminals and single issue fanatics now have access to weaponry that – ten years ago – was the exclusive preserve of terrorists. In addition to the availability of conventional weaponry and the developing lethality of conventional weapons, there is the threat of CBRN materials either used alone or in conjunction with conventional weapons. We cannot plan on the assumption that these weapons will not be used. We need to plan and prepare in a manner commensurate with the risk.

The motivation of terrorism has also expanded to include the extremist and even millenarian motives - for those who take on apocalyptic view of the year 2000.

Lawless zones – where effective law enforcement is elusive – are increasingly venues of hostage taking as European business and recreational travel expands.

There is also a trend to privatisation of victims of terrorism. There were 439 targets of international terror in 1997 - 324 were business related.

International terror figures *overall* are reducing from the peaks of the mid - 1980s but individual incidents are becoming more deadly. 221 people died in international terror incidents in 1997 224 died on 7th August 1998 in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam

Not only have terrorist methods, motives and means changed but so has the nature of the target – any major western city is a 'target – rich' environment where life depends on an increasingly vulnerable infrastructure.

In summary

Future international terrorism is more complex, diverse and unpredictable. Attacks will be intermittent but deadly. Victims will be innocent civilians. This is an era of low intensity / high impact terrorism. For us the responsibility is long term resolution and further investment in an integrated all threats, all hazards approach - our mission remains **to save the lives of the hostages.**

A COMPARISON OF CRISIS NEGOTIATION ACROSS EUROPE

Ellen Giebels

Introduction

Hostage taking is a major problem in a broad range of situations including terrorist attacks, domestic crises, suicide attempts, criminal kidnaps, and prison revolts. Law enforcement professionals in many European countries increasingly rely on negotiation as a peaceful alternative to tactical assault in ending hostage incidents. Little is known about similarities and differences concerning the management of hostage incidents across European countries. To gain insight into these matters, a Hostage Negotiation Inventory was designed and distributed among national and regional hostage negotiation co-ordinators from the Police Forces in the European Member States, and some Candidate Member States.

The Inventory explored:

1. National and/or regional organisation, negotiation team composition, and ground rules;
2. Characteristics of hostage negotiation incidents and perpetrators from September 1997 to September 1998;
3. General psychological processes and requirements, and needs for evaluation, selection, and training.

To minimise the time to complete the Inventory, the majority of questions provided the response categories or simply asked for an estimated number or percentage. Since there is no international database containing the details of hostage negotiation co-ordinators, members of the board of advisors and the organising committee of the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations helped identify co-ordinators. Co-ordinators were also traced through the individuals that registered for the conference. Approximately 60 inventories were distributed among the identified regional or national co-ordinators.

The current overview is based upon information provided by 29 co-ordinators reflecting a response rate of 48 %. Although this percentage may appear somewhat low, it must be noted that 13 of the 18 European countries represented at the conference participated in the research, which indicates an alternative response rate of 72 %. The difference in percentages may be explained by the fact that some

countries have only one national co-ordinator, while other countries have many regional co-ordinators. While most of the national co-ordinators returned the Inventory, some of the regional co-ordinators did not. Since the participants in the research were assured that the information provided is treated confidentially, the results presented here will not refer to the outcomes of individual countries.

Respondents
The Inventory was returned by *10 national co-ordinators* from: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia. Also, *19 regional co-ordinators* from: Germany (6), the Netherlands (4), Sweden (1, Stockholm region), and the United Kingdom (8; including Scotland and Wales), participated in the research. The co-ordinators were predominantly male – only 3 co-ordinators were female –, and they were 42 years on average with a range from 29 years to 59 years.

Results
The overview of results given below will be presented in 5 paragraphs, that is (1) negotiator profile, (2) negotiation team characteristics, (3) ground rules, (4) incident types, and (5) training and information needs.

(1) Negotiator profile
As a rule, hostage negotiator is considered a part-time, secondary police function. In one country only, some regions employ full-time negotiators. Many countries require a minimum rank of inspector (or sergeant on the list of promotion) and a maximum rank of superintendent. Some countries have a minimum of four to five years one is assigned on the job. Once selected by superiors or a team of experts, negotiators follow a 1 to 3 week hostage negotiation course, which also includes exercises with tactical teams. An exception to this general rule was found in one German region where negotiators received a one-year training. On average, one out of 5 negotiators is female. The highest percentage of female negotiators reported is 42 %. Yet, some countries do not have female negotiators at all.

(2) Negotiation team characteristics
Clearly, hostage negotiation is a team effort. None of the co-ordinators report having negotiators work alone. On average, negotiators operate in teams of 2-5 negotiators, while the number of negotiators involved increases with the severity and complexity of the incident. Most co-ordinators (80 %) report working in fixed teams; the remaining 20 % usually work in variable teams.

(3) Ground rules

Without exception, the participating countries agree on two important ground rules: (a) minimum use of force and (b) save all lives. Figure 1 gives the relative importance of safety for each of the four involved parties, i.e., public, hostage(s), police, and perpetrator(s).



All co-ordinators agreed that the safety of the public and the hostages is of utmost importance. However, they were more divided about the importance of safety for the police involved and even more so about the importance of safety for the hostage-takers. Yet, on average, these were still considered rather important.

We also asked which issues are considered negotiable when talking to a perpetrator. While designing the Inventory experienced negotiators helped us to identify the issues that could come up during a hostage-taking incident. Food, drinks and medical supplies are issues that can be discussed in all countries, while the exchange of hostages for police or non-police is out of the question.

(4) Incident types
In the Inventory we distinguished between 7 incident types police negotiators can be deployed in, to wit:

- Barricaded suspects
- Criminal kidnaps
- Political kidnaps
- Criminal high risk arrest situations
- Suicide attempts
- Domestic situations
- Prison riots

All the countries that participated in the research employed negotiators in two types of incidents: criminal kidnaps and barricaded suspects. Of the remaining categories police negotiators often do not deal with criminal high-risk arrest situations and prison riots. Several co-ordinators added the following types of incidents negotiators are deployed in:

- Extortion (blackmail/product contamination)
- Hijack
- Demonstrations/environmental protest barricade situations
- Industrial disputes

Figure 2: negotiator involvement in national incidents

747 incidents in 10 countries

• suicide attempts	31%
• domestic situations	26%
• criminal high risk arrest situations	12%
• extortion	11%
• barricaded suspects	10%
• criminal kidnap	9%
• other	1%

We also tried to get insight into the occurrence rate of these incident types. Figure 2 and 3 provide statistics for the period September 1997 to September 1998. Remarkably, a considerable number of co-ordinators reported not being able to provide these statistics due to insufficient or incomplete registration.

With regard to national incidents, the co-ordinators from 10 countries reported 747 incidents. As can be seen in Figure 2, over 50 % of these incidents concerned emotionally or psychologically disturbed individuals in domestic situations or in suicide incidents. With regard to cross-border incidents we see that these primarily concern more 'rational' perpetrators involved in criminal kidnaps and extortion (see Figure 3). Furthermore, we observe a much smaller occurrence rate of 34 incidents. Thus, approximately, the ratio between cross-border and national incidents is 1:20. Twenty-four of the 29 co-ordinators (83 %) reported having national guidelines for crisis negotiation, while only 4 co-ordinators reported having international guidelines (14 %).

Figure 3: negotiator involvement in cross-border incidents

34 incidents in 10 countries

- criminal kidnaps 62 %
- extortion 24 %
- political kidnaps 9 %
- other 5 %
- problem areas
  - language & culture
  - legislation
  - organisation

(5) Training and information need

Figures 4 and 5 give – in order of priority – the issues negotiators feel they should have more training in and information about. In accordance with the relatively high occurrence rate of the emotionally focused domestic and suicide incidents, negotiators indicate a specific need for more information about assessing the perpetrator's emotional stability, and, to a lesser extent, suicide indicators. In fact, many of the high priority issues have to do with an accurate psychological assessment of the hostage-taker as well as the situation. Please also note the high need for more information and training in the area of cross-border incidents.





Concluding remarks

This research provided a first comparison of the organisation and management of hostage-taking incidents within Europe. Despite some differences, the similarities between countries and regions are striking. Most countries seem to have adopted the same concept for negotiation in hostage-taking incidents, especially in terms of the team organisation and the ground rules. However, some of the issues that appeared to be negotiable in one country were not negotiable in another country, which may cause problems when encountering cross-border incidents. Concurrent with international developments, national and regional co-ordinators also indicated a high need for more training and information for the management of cross-border incidents. Although cross border incidents represent only a small part of all hostage-taking situations they are by no means rare events.
All in al, the Inventory increased insights in terms of working methods for hostage negotiations. However, it also highlighted the often incomplete or insufficient registration of actual incidents, situational and perpetrator characteristics and the final outcomes. This is unfortunate because these data not only may uncover flaws in the deployment of negotiators as well as the equipment they use; in comparing findings over years important trends may unfold. Such insights may be of help in anticipating future developments.

THE USE OF BEHAVIOURAL EXPERTS IN CRISIS NEGOTIATION

Ellen Giebels and Otto M.J. Adang

Professional crisis negotiation is part of the police response to critical incidents since the seventies. Several large-scale, politically motivated hostage situations and hijackings urged the need for professionally trained communicators, known as 'hostage negotiators' (Veness, this volume). Since then, the shift from a purely tactical police intervention to a communication-based approach has proved successful in a broad range of life-threatening crisis situations. US data show that the 'contain and negotiate' method results in approximately 1 % chance of injury or death, while assaulting a hostage taker results in more than 70 % chance of injury or death (Greenstone, 1995). Comparable figures for European countries are not available, but there is little doubt that the deployment of hostage negotiators in Europe is successful as well.

Crucial to the effective handling of hostage negotiation situations is insight into human behaviour and its determinants. Often, behavioural experts assist the police in the area of crisis intervention. Prior to the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations, 19 behavioural experts with experience in police work met in a symposium chaired by Evert van de Vliert from the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. The goals of the meeting were:
- to gain insight into the roles of behavioural experts in hostage-taking incidents;
- to identify complementary and joint research interests;
- to lay foundations for future co-ordination or co-operation.

State of affairs

Most countries employ behavioural experts – usually psychologists – in the following areas:

(1) *Selection and training.* Psychologists often assist in the selection process of hostage negotiators. They also provide training in negotiation skills and help to improve psychological sensitivity to the interactive dynamics of crisis negotiations.

(2) *Operational support*, including psychological profiling of the hostage-taker(s), advice about negotiation strategies, and monitoring group processes in the negotiation cell.

(3) *Post negotiation assistance*, for example in debriefing negotiators and victims. The participants indicated they have very little contacts with behavioural experts in both their own as well as other countries. Therefore, a first avenue for co-operation that was identified refers to the exchange of working methods. Besides such an exchange of 'best practice', participants expressed the need for further developing and elaborating on the behavioural science component in crisis negotiation. In this respect negotiation research and theory may prove beneficial.

Crisis negotiation research

Specific research concerning hostage negotiations is non-existent in Europe. Three first priority avenues fur further research were identified:

1. Simple statistics
A first attempt to gain insight into simple incident statistics (Giebels, this volume) showed that in many countries these data are not available or unreliable. This is unfortunate because a comparison of findings over years may unfold important trends that may help to effectively respond to future developments. Participants indicated that specific knowledge may prove beneficial with respect to two areas in particular. First, research may show how to anticipate the increasing number of crisis incidents in which individuals with different cultural backgrounds are involved. In this respect, an international database, which includes incident information from many culturally different countries, may be helpful. Second, research findings may suggest how to negotiate across individual-group boundaries. Usually, negotiators are taught how to respond to individuals with different psychological profiles. Increased insight is needed when dealing with groups of perpetrators as well as perpetrators whose framework is based on a group identity (cults etc.).

2. Different perspectives
Research and training usually departs from the perspective of the police negotiator. That is, within the triangle perpetrator-negotiator-victim the focus is primarily on the negotiator-perpetrator relationship and looks at it from the police negotiator's perspective. As a consequence, there is relatively little insight into underlying cognition and motivations of the perpetrator, especially when this is difficult to infer from the interaction. Inferences about a perpetrator's motivations and thoughts are usually more difficult to estimate when dealing with a 'rational' negotiator as opposed to incidents with an emotionally or psychologically disturbed individual. Police negotiators often deal with relatively rational negotiators, for example in kidnap and extortion cases. A second conclusion is that

negotiator training and practice may benefit from increased insight into negotiator – victim and perpetrator – victim relationships.
Both issues raised here may be addressed by systematically linking recorded hostage negotiations (transcripts or audio/video-tapes) of actual incidents to post-incident interviews with the parties involved. The interviews may particularly tap into the underlying motivations, cognition and emotions associated with critical incidents during interaction.

3. Review of existing models
Furthermore, numerous negotiation and communication models exist that can be applied to the specific context of hostage-taking incidents. For example, Rogan's model of Relational Development in Hostage Negotiation was discussed (Rogan, this volume). It would be useful to review these models and to test their relevance for hostage negotiations. This may also provide a coherent structure for understanding and interpreting the ground rules – 'do's and don'ts' – currently employed in crisis negotiation. Eventually, a tailor-made model for crisis negotiation may be tested by relating recorded negotiations to structured in-depth interviews with the key parties involved.

Conclusion

Behavioural experts play an important role in training and selection, they provide support in actual incidents, and they may also prove valuable in further developing the field of crisis intervention by using research related insights. From a review of existing literature (which is mainly of Northern American origin) several relevant issues for research can be identified which are currently not being dealt with.

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F. I. R. E.: A COMMUNICATION-BASED APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING CRISIS NEGOTIATION

Randall Gage Rogan

Introduction

I would like to share with you some ideas about a communication-based approach for understanding the dynamic processes of crisis/hostage negotiations, derived from work that my colleague, Dr. Mitchell Hammer of The American University in Washington, DC, and I have been doing for more than eight years. This research involves analyses of the verbal communication of actual crisis/hostage negotiation incidents; the findings of which have been published in academic and practitioner journals. Our research method involves an integration of quantitative and qualitative analyses of negotiation discourse that is grounded in communication and conflict theory, and focuses on the communication of both suspects and negotiators. Our findings have been confirmed and validated by the feedback we have received from negotiators with whom we have shared our results.

I will commence with a review of traditional models/approaches to managing crisis/hostage negotiations. This will involve a discussion of the central qualities of each approach, along with a summarisation of the limitations of each method. This will be followed by an overview of our alternative approach – the F.I.R.E. model. I will then demonstrate application of the model by analyzing sample text from an actual negotiation. Following this will be a discussion of the applicability of the F.I.R.E. model for understanding cross-cultural interactions. I will conclude with some guidelines concerning crisis negotiation from a F.I.R.E. model perspective.

TRADITONAL NEGOTIATION APPROACHES

The Contending Approach

Prior to 1972, the primary law enforcement strategy for resolving hostage/crisis incidents was a contending approach; part of which involved confronting the suspect with an overwhelming show of force. Two key strategies to this approach were first, to demand that the perpetrator release the hostages and surrender, and second, to execute a planned assault if the suspect refused. Although a communication link might be established between the police and the suspect, no

real negotiation took place; no true effort was made to understand the needs and motives of the perpetrator; no attention was given to discerning the instrumental/expressive orientation of the hostage taker. Rather, communication between law enforcement and the suspect was geared primarily to convincing him to surrender, or face the consequences of an armed assault.

Visible displays of weaponry, firepower, personnel, and environmental control are basic in communicating to the perpetrator the disproportionate odds with which he/she is confronted. Often, power and utilities are disrupted, while other stimulating tactics are employed (e.g., loud music, bright lights at night, helicopter fly-overs) to harass the suspect and to produce conditions of deprivation, as well as heightened anxiety.

Within this framework, the focus is on the suspects' violation of social norms and laws as he holds hostages or barricades himself from police. In response, law enforcement engages in a process of intimidation and coercion in an effort to convince the perpetrator to surrender. Within this context, the perpetrator is presumed to be rational and his/her emotionality a variable to be manipulated by the police. Central to this approach is the belief that when presented with such an array of force, all of which serves to highlight the suspect's vulnerability, the perpetrator will be rational enough to surrender. The job of the negotiator, therefore, is to convince the suspect that if he/she surrenders peacefully, he/she will not be harmed.

Contentious tactics can be useful in forcing a reluctant adversary in to rethinking his position and getting him to the negotiation table. Not surprisingly, however, contentious tactics often fail to produce the positive results desired. The principal limitation of contending is that such behaviors by one party often prompt reciprocal actions by the other. This often leads to escalatory spirals of retaliation, resulting in a continual growth in hostility. Additional limitations include forcing parties into taking positional stances, engendering extreme competitiveness, and an apparent lack of concern for either the suspect's or negotiator's emotional needs.

Following the Attica prison riot and the Munich Olympic incidents, law enforcement began to look more closely at how they managed these incidents. What emerged was an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of negotiation as an alternative to tactical assault.

Two approaches that evolved out of this focus are the bargaining model and the psychotherapeutic model.

The Bargaining Model

One way to understand this approach is in terms of the work of Miron & Goldstein (1979) who posited that a suspect's behavioral motivation could be viewed as existing along an instrumental - expressive continuum. Briefly, instrumental issues denote the individuals' situationally related, substantive and non-substantive wants and demands. More specifically, substantive instrumental concerns represent the tangible desires/objectives of the suspect (e.g., money, goods, services) that are directly pertinent to the situation, while non-substantive issues denote those tangible wants not directly relevant to the incident (e.g., pizza, drink, cigarettes). Comparatively, expressive motivations are grounded in emotional or relational desires (e.g., power, sympathy, and attention).

According to the bargaining model, crisis/hostage negotiations are primarily conceptualized as falling at the instrumental end of the instrumental - expressive continuum. The focus is on a traditional bargaining approach to negotiation in which the parties involved in the conflict are dedicated to dictating or clarifying their individual substantive instrumental wants and demands. Resolution is attempted through bargaining that is typified by a quid pro quo interaction. This approach includes such negotiating tactics as making the perpetrator work for everything he gets, using time to one's advantage, not relinquishing too much too soon to a perpetrator, and getting something for everything given. The underlying assumption to these techniques is the perpetrator's rational decision making ability. The premise of this approach is that once the suspect realizes that his costs are too high to continue in the standoff with police, he will surrender.

As evidenced by these tactics, concern for expressive needs is minimized. In fact, within a traditional bargaining framework, emotion is generally regarded as an addendum, or even a hindrance, to the primary instrumental/rational orientation of the interaction. This is perhaps the most critical limitation of the bargaining model. By focusing primarily on instrumental concerns, other relational and identity concerns are relegated to a secondary status, important only when they impact on instrumental objectives. Consequently, opposing parties are forced into conflicting positions and to negotiating over demands relative to their respective positions.

While a bargaining approach can be effective when both conflict parties are focused on their instrumental objectives and are willing to negotiate them to reach an agreement, such is not typically the case in most crisis/hostage negotiations. For example, one recent study revealed that perpetrators made no demands in one-quarter of the incidents analyzed, while in those situations in which demands were communicated, those demands went unsatisfied 57% of the time (Head, 1988). A recent survey of hostage negotiation team leaders in the United States revealed that suicides, barricaded subject, domestic disputes, and

criminal/high-risk situations account the vast majority of the incidents negotiators actually manage (Rogan, Hammer, & VanZandt, 1994). Similarly, McMains and Mullins (1996) note that 82 percent of all police negotiations deal with incidents other than actual hostage-takings. They suggest that of the 18 percent that did involve a hostage, a notable percentage were 'psuedo-hostage-takings' in which the suspect was more intent on making the hostage a victim than using him as a bargaining resource. Finally, Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) contend that most hostage negotiations are the consequence of an individual failing to effectively manage a life-stressing event and as such constitute crisis management. In sum, traditional instrumental bargaining is not the most appropriate framework for resolving most hostage negotiations. It was this realization that prompted a re-conceptualization of hostage negotiation as primarily an expressive interaction. This is the basis for the third model of negotiation.

Psychotherapeutic Model

According to Harvey Schlossberg (1979) a critical characteristic of expressive based hostage incidents is that the hostage serves no instrumental value to the perpetrator. Rather, any hostage that is taken is done so for the purpose of drawing attention to the needs or plight of the suspect himself. Similarly, in those incidents in which no hostage is taken (e.g., suicides, barricaded subject), the goal of the suspect is simply to gain attention to his/her situation. In this way, the negotiator has nothing that the suspect wants, in a material/instrumental sense. Therefore, attempts to negotiate with the suspect about substantive wants and demands will unlikely produce the desired results of a negotiated surrender. Consequently, negotiators must work to elicit the concerns and feelings of the suspect and thereby convey an empathic understanding of the perpetrator's (crisis) condition in order to achieve resolution. The objective of creating an empathic relationship with a perpetrator is ultimately to enable the negotiator to modify the suspect's behavior. In so doing, negotiators can effectively reduce the perpetrator's level of emotional arousal and facilitate rational problem solving. Contrasted with the bargaining approach, the psychotherapeutic model emphasizes the central role of emotion and relationship development to incident resolution. Managing the suspect's emotional arousal is central to successful incident resolution. In order to achieve these objectives, negotiators need to learn and practice crisis intervention techniques that include such skills as active listening, self-disclosure, paraphrasing, and question asking. Of these skills, listening is often regarded as the linchpin in helping perpetrators vent pent-up anxiety, thereby facilitating a reduction in emotional arousal and effectuating more rational problem-solving.

It has been estimated that the majority of incidents negotiators actually confront involve a perpetrator characterized by mental or emotional disorder. In fact, it is estimated that a majority of all negotiations are perpetrated by suspects who have clinically diagnosed mental and/or emotional disorders, including antisocial personality, depression, paranoia, and inadequate personality (Borum & Strentz, 1992; Fuselier, 1981a). Consequently, negotiators are also encouraged to gain intelligence about the personality traits of perpetrators in order to employ specific communication strategies for negotiating with these suspects.

The psychotherapeutic model of negotiation has contributed significantly to law enforcement's ability to manage crisis/hostage negotiations. Unfortunately, this perspective simply serves to reinforce a (potentially false) bifurcation of rationality (instrumentality) and emotionality (expressiveness), wherein an expressive approach to negotiation is employed only to reduce emotionality and thereby facilitate rational problem solving. This position tends to relegate emotion to being an addendum to rationality that must be dealt with only in those incidents noted as expressive and in which it directly impacts on instrumental issues. Focusing on personality and/or mental state results in a labelling of the suspect as 'crazy,' 'deranged,' and 'irrational.' Finally, a predominately expressive focus tends to diminish the importance of other conflict issues (i.e., relational concerns, and instrumental concerns).

These three traditional models of crisis negotiation have been extremely beneficial in helping us to better understand and manage crisis incidents. However, taken together, these approaches are marked by some notable limitations. First, each model implicitly informs negotiators to focus on only on one approach at a time (i.e., contending, bargaining, and counselling). Second, within each approach, all other conflict issues that are irrelevant to the specific model are minimized. Third, although expressive concerns are acknowledged, the tendency is to regard relational, face, and emotion concerns as important only to reach rational problem solving. Fourth, the negotiation process is delineated in a linear sequence of stages. And finally, rationality and emotion are unnecessarily dichotomized. As an alternative we offer the F.I.R.E. model.

THE F.I.R.E. MODEL

Contrasted with the bargaining and psychotherapeutic models, which emphasize relatively stable qualities and behaviors of the perpetrator, this communication-based approach focuses on the functional meaning of communicative symbols (i.e., words, gestures) expressed by persons during a conflict interaction. The central ingredient of this model is the way in which language functions to communicate a person's interpretation and definition of an interaction and to create shared meaning between the conflicting parties.

In part, this model is based on the proposition that human communication is a transactional phenomenon between two individuals engaged in a mutually created interaction in which messages and meaning are conjointly operationalized. The focus is on the reciprocal dynamic relationship of the communicators, rather than the structural, psychological, or motivational qualities of the individual. For crisis negotiation, this means that we focus on the communication of both the perpetrator and the negotiator, rather than solely on the psychological disposition or specific behaviors of the suspect. In this way, negotiators can attend to the full range of conflict issues manifest in an incident.

Further, this model is grounded in a theory of communication that distinguishes two levels of meaning in communication, namely a content level and a relational level. The content level denotes the precise information or data that is being discussed, while the relationship level provides information about how the content dimension should be understood in terms of the nature of the relationship between the interactants. More specifically, the relational dimension speaks to who the interactants are, how they see themselves in relation to the other person, and how they view the other person relative to themselves in this particular communicative exchange. In this way, relational level communication is metacommunication that provides information about how a person's messages should be interpreted and also provides insight into the state of the interactants' relationship. For example, a perpetrator making the statement to a negotiator: 'It's taking too long to get the food in here!' is not merely saying that there seems to be a delay in the delivery of the food, but perhaps more importantly, that he feels that he is being manipulated and not taken seriously.

Also basic to this communication-based model of crisis negotiation is the concept of communicative framing. Framing is a process by which individuals create verbal descriptions and/or representations of an issue or relationship. These representations are most notably communicated via relational level communication. Individuals in conflict tend to operate from a single dominant frame as a means to express their concerns, but may change frames as a consequence of frame satisfaction or negotiation. Negotiators can shift frames after some degree of resolution of issues within the existing discourse frame has been achieved. In contrast, attempts to shift frames too early can result in conflict escalation. Four interpersonal goals/concerns that characterize all conflict interactions constitute the four discourse frames captured in the F.I.R.E. model. These include face concerns, instrumental issues, relational issues, and emotion needs. We contend that these four frames structure and focus the negotiation discourse between negotiator and perpetrator.

Let me now turn our attention to a brief review of the four frames of the F.I.R.E. Model.

Face Concerns

We define face as the positive social image a person desires to claim for himself during a social interaction. In other words, individual concern for face is grounded in a desire to maintain a positive social expression of one-self. As such, face (identity) is an abiding sense of self and who one is in relation to the world. In this way, face is inherently interwoven into, and dependent upon, the communicative dynamics of a specific interaction. Within the context of conflict interaction in general, and crisis negotiation specifically, face is a critical concern for both perpetrators and negotiators. Given the publicly visible and confrontational nature of crisis negotiation, face is a constant concern throughout the duration of a crisis incident. Therefore, negotiators have the challenging task of attempting to manage their own face concerns as well as those of the perpetrator.

Two types of face that are particularly central to crisis negotiation include social/group face and personal/individual face. Personal face/identity is based on an individual's unique perceptions of his/her own attributes (e.g., strong, weak, intelligent) while social identity consists of those characteristics and their emotional significance that is attached to one's membership in a social group. The importance of these two types of face can vary from incident to incident, within an incident, and by culture. For example, personal identity concern is most salient for those negotiations involving a suicidal person and is most important for Euro-Americans.[1] Comparatively, social identity seems to be of greatest concern in negotiations with members of social groups, cults, or particular national organizations, and of greatest concern to South Asians. Nonetheless, regardless of the specific face focus, communication that attacks or threatens another's face concern escalates conflict, while communication that honors another's face results in conflict de-escalation. The role of the negotiator is to identify the suspect's key identity frame and to manage his specific face needs.

Instrumental Concerns

An instrumental behavioral orientation denotes individual concern for objective and generally tangible wants and demands. Within the context of crisis negotiation, two fundamental types of instrumental objectives have been identified: substantive wants and demands and non-substantive wants/demands. Substantive demands deal with situationally related wants while non-substantive

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[1] Note: I use the term Euro-American to denote Caucasian United States Americans of European descent.

demands attend to wants that are not directly dependent upon the specific situation. For example, a perpetrator who requests a car to flee the scene of an attempted bank robbery with hostages is communicating a substantive demand. On the other hand, if this same suspect was to request a pizza and some coke, he would be communicating a non-substantive instrumental demand as food and drink are not situationally related objectives. In fact, it would behoove the suspect not to request pizza during a negotiation as it will typically arrive cold and without the desired toppings. The suspect could do better with a pizza delivery service. Our research has shown that an increased expression of non-substantive demands and greater expressed commitment to previously communicated substantive demands tends to be associated with conflict escalation and relational conflict issues involving power and trust. Comparatively, increased flexibility toward substantive wants and a reduction in the number of non-substantive demands is related to conflict de-escalation.

Relational Concerns

Relational message behavior denotes an individual's concern for the nature of the relationship with another person. Trust, power, and affiliation are three core facets of all personal relationships. Within the context of crisis negotiation these qualities are of critical importance to negotiators as they strive to develop an empathic relationship with the suspect. Understanding each of these dimensions and how they become manifest in a person's verbal communication is essential for incident resolution.

To begin, relational power issues concern the degree of agreement between conflict interactants along a dominance/non-dominance dimension. Dominance is manifest in language that reflects control and authority, while non-dominance is noted by submissiveness and compliance. For example, statements such as 'Get my wife, now!' or 'I'll do it my way or no way' are reflective of relational dominance. Comparatively, the statements: 'I don't know what to do', and 'Help me, I don't understand what's going on' communicate non-dominance and low relational power. Relational trust is concerned with believability in the word and future action of another person. For example, in attempting to establish trust negotiators must sometimes overcome the suspect's distrust of the police when the verbal communication of the negotiator conflicts with the non-verbal actions of the tactical team. Finally, affiliation refers to the level of interpersonal closeness established between perpetrator and negotiator, as communicated via expressions of empathy, liking, and respect for the other. Such information and knowledge is important to the relationship because it helps interactants make decisions about how much and the kind of information to share, how to formally structure the relationship, and whether or not to continue the relationship. Given the centrality

of relational development to crisis management, it is not surprising that negotiators are instructed to work diligently to create a trusting and empathic relationship with the suspect.

Emotion Concerns

As noted in the preceding discussions about the contending and bargaining approaches to negotiation, emotion was initially of little direct concern to incident resolution efforts. However, with the advancement of the psychotherapeutic approach, the centrality of emotion to crisis negotiation was more clearly articulated. With increased attention devoted to the expressive motivation of the perpetrator, the suspect's emotional state became a crucial ingredient in determining the success or failure of a negotiated outcome. As discussed previously, the psychotherapeutic model requires that negotiators learn appropriate effective listening and interaction skills in order to deal with perpetrator emotion as a means for reducing the potential for negative and violent (fight/flight) reactions on the part of the perpetrator. The premise of this approach is that by reducing suspect emotion the negotiator will facilitate increased rationality and normative bargaining into the interaction.

From a communication standpoint, emotion can be understood in terms of three expressive dimensions: valence, intensity, and expressiveness. Briefly, valence denotes the positive/negative feelings associated with an emotional expression, intensity refers to the strength of the communicator's felt emotional expression, and expressiveness denotes how visibly an individual communicates his/her emotions. The suspect's verbal communication is a primary source by which each of these dimensions are made manifest and as such, constitute the means by which the negotiator can gauge the perpetrator's emotional condition. Unlike previous models that advocate reducing emotion to achieve rationality, we propose that negotiators need to reduce the suspect's level of emotional arousal (excitation) and transform the emotional experience from negative to positive (e.g., from hopelessness to hopefulness in the future). To realize this objective, the negotiator must strive to understand the perpetrator's core emotional reality as manifest in his/her verbal and non-verbal communication. In this way, the suspect's surrender decision is based in feelings of trust, support, understanding, and hope, (not wanting to die) as opposed to logic and rationality.

In sum, the F.I.R.E model is an analytic tool that can be used for understanding the dynamics of a crisis negotiation incident as manifest in the relational dimension of perpetrator and negotiator communication. Its focus is inclusive of instrumental and expressive concerns. Surrender of the suspect is achieved through the negotiator's convergence and resolution of the perpetrator's dominant communicative frame. Finally, it is critical to note that the negotiator works not to

eliminate the suspect's emotionality, but rather, to transform it from negative to positive.

DEMONSTRATED APPLICATION OF THE F.I.R.E. MODEL

At his point, I'd like to demonstrate the applicability of the F.I.R.E. model by analyzing some dialogue from an actual crisis negotiation incident. Rather than attempting to critique the incident for all four of the F.I.R.E. dimensions, I will focus principally on face concerns. Please note that the names in this incident have been changed in an effort to mask the actual identities. Also note that we believe that the negotiator involved in this incident did an extremely professional job of managing this crisis event.

Text 1

Utterance	Speaker	Message
001	Perp.	Hello
002	Neg.	Hi Bill?
003	Perp.	Yes,
004	Neg.	Rich again. How's it going?
005	Perp.	S'alright.
006	Neg.	Okay, we got a call out for Larry...Um...He's in the field someplace, we're trying to get a hold of him ...Um...,We checked on Joe...He's in the city here but we're not sure exactly where right now but I expect to hear back... well... probably within the next half hour or so exactly where he is.
007	Perp.	That's a long time.
008	Neg.	Well, it's not that long. *(pause)*. Where do we stand now? What do you...Where do we go from here?
009	Perp.	I have...I have to go out...I have to terminate myself. I induce no other way out.
010	Neg.	Well...As I said before, I think you're selling yourself short on that.

As can be seen from this dialogue the negotiator is re-establishing contact with the suspect and updating him regarding progress in contacting a person with whom the suspect wants to talk. This instrumental focus dominates the interchange and is reinforced in line 008 in which the negotiator asks the perpetrator 'Where do we go from here?' At this point, the suspect states that he must kill himself as he perceives no other way of dealing with his present situation (line 009). In line 010

the negotiator transitions into a personal face supportive mode as he attempts to convince the suspect that he is limiting his options.

Text 2

Utterance	Speaker	Message
011	Perp.	Nobody sells themselves short if they have to pick between the two.
012	Neg.	But you're making assumptions that you only have a few choices, and I don't think that's necessarily the case.
013	Perp.	Well it isn't fair. I have to join Mary.
014	Neg.	Well, as I said before...I'm still trying to check on that situation too.
015	Perp.	No, she's gone, I have to join her.
016	Neg.	Well, we don't know that for a fact yet, Bill...You're making an assumption.
017	Perp.	No, I know she's gone.
018	Neg.	Then again, the people that you're trying to help, they need you.
019	Perp.	They don't need me!
020	Neg.	Who have they got?
021	Perp.	They'll...They'll do it for themselves now.
022	Neg.	Who's going to do it for them?
023	Perp.	They will do it.

In this second set of text, the suspect and negotiator continue their discussion about the perpetrator's options, with a clear focus on his personal face needs (lines 011 through 012). At line 013 the suspect re-emphasizes his need to kill himself because he has killed his girlfriend. At his point, the negotiator shifts into an instrumental mode as he attempts to minimize the girlfriend's death (line 014). The perpetrator rebuts the negotiators' claim, stating emphatically that she is dead (line 015). Again, the negotiator attempts to refute the suspect's claim (line 016). This results in an emphatic reassertion by the suspect that she is in fact dead (line 017). This short exchange results in a disconnect between the negotiator and suspect as they ostensibly argue over a fact the suspect knows to be true. Realizing that he is not making progress with the suspect, the negotiator quickly shifts to an appeal to the perpetrator's sense of group identity (line 018). However, the suspect flatly denies any sense of group face concern (line 019). Nonetheless, the negotiator continues to engage the suspect in a discussion focusing on the social face dimension through line 032.

Text 3

Utterance	Speaker	Message
032	Neg.	Do you belong to a...group? Do you have an organization of your own?
033	Perp.	You'll find that out...I've messed things up.
034	Neg.	Well I'd just like to know...It's...You know again...I'm trying to point out to you that you're a strong person...You're an extremely strong person...And you've got a lotta...A lot of room to move and you've=
035	Perp.	I've
036	Neg.	=got a lot of things for people that you have a strong feeling for.
037	Perp.	I've fouled it up.
038	Neg.	Nothing...There's nothing that can't be corrected...Nothing...
039	Perp.	I did something that cannot be corrected.
040	Neg.	Well again, that's just an assumption and you're selling yourself short.

In line 033 the suspect dismisses the negotiator's attempts to focus on group face concerns and redirects the emphasis to his individual face. The negotiator deftly responds to this shift and attends to the suspect's personal face (line 034). The two parties continue this interaction (lines 035 through 040), with the suspect attacking his own personal face and the negotiator communicating primarily other personal face support. The one exception is the negotiator's reference to group face in line 036.

Text 4

Utterance	Speaker	Message
043	Perp.	I have no alternative, you have lots of alternatives.
044	Neg.	Do you think the drugs are the whole problem? Its just...Kinda should deal without...Deal without...Deal with people without using medication?
045	Perp.	No, I believe that Valium was fine...I was very concerned that they'd take Valium off the market. Once you become hooked on it, ya know I get into this whole thing in San Francisco to raise money...(sigh)...for the...and then it...In order to get into it you have to take the Valium. You've gotta do something so you look like you need disability. And then all of the sudden I realize you're hooked on it. I didn't know that you would become hooked on it.
046	Neg.	Did you ever take anything else?
047	Perp.	I took Acid in '68 and couldn't do anything else I was hallucinating so bad. I took Angel Dust in San Francisco unbeknownst to myself twice...people...sneaked it on me.
048	Neg.	How'd that affect ya?
049	Perp.	Bad'Very bad.
050	Neg.	Still get flashbacks from that?
051	Perp.	I don't think so. I...You know it's....I know you people wanna write me off as crazy but=

The suspect continues his principal self face focus on line 043. However, beginning at line 044, the negotiator shifts the conversational focus to an instrumental orientation. The suspect responds to this theme and follows the lead of the negotiator until line 051. At this point, the perpetrator suspects that the negotiator is attacking his personal face needs and re-introduces this focus (line 051).

Text 5

Utterance	Speaker	Message
052	Neg.	You know...
053	Perp.	=I'm not that crazy, I may be slightly warped who knows everybody's warped to a degree, but I am not that crazy.
054	Neg.	But those are the exact things...That...are...really your strong suit. If you could deal with...Ya know convince people that you've had some bad trips with Acid and Angel Dust...The far-reaching effects of that still aren't known. But it...The flashbacks and the problems that occur from that are horrendous. Now–
055	Perp	What's that got to do with anything? I don't understand what you mean.
056	Neg.	But that's=You know if that's having an affect on you now hopefully they can deal with that and any problems you've had up to this point you can attribute directly to that. Ya know, so write that off...It's not a problem.
057	Perp.	Are you...Are you trying to tell me the bullshit that I should try to say that the things that happened to Mary can be attributed to drugs? It's bullshit. I will not...I will not cop that.

At line 054 the negotiator attempts to support the perpetrator's personal face, yet he does so by maintaining the instrumental theme initiated in line 044. The suspect continues to rebuff the negotiator and his attempts to address personal face concerns via an instrumental tact. Finally, this results in an aggressive outburst by the suspect in line 057 as he communicatively disconnects from the negotiator.

Through this exercise I have attempted to provide a cursory demonstration of the applicability of the F.I.R.E. model as an analytic tool for dissecting the negotiation discourse of both the suspect and negotiator. As shown in this demonstration, we can identify the suspect's primary concern for personal face needs, as opposed to social face and instrumental issues. Such interpretative ability can enable a negotiator to more effectively match the dominant needs of the perpetrator and thereby communicate an empathic understanding for his/her problem as the negotiator works toward incident resolution. In other words, the four F.I.R.E. dimensions are a means for interpreting the dominant communicative themes of a

suspect, and as such, provide insight into the perpetrators' perception and definition of the interaction.

CULTURAL APPLICATION OF THE F.I.R.E. MODEL

At this point, I would like to briefly shift our attention to the cross-cultural application of the F.I.R.E. model. More specifically, I want to show how the four dimensions of the F.I.R.E. model can be useful for understanding the communicative framing of persons from differing cultures. For demonstration purposes I will compare Euro-Americans with Southeast Asians. This discussion is based in part on research that Dr. Hammer and I have recently conducted.

Face Concerns

Regarding face concerns, Euro-Americans are primarily motivated by an individual and self focused orientation. The are principally concerned for individual face needs and as such, their communication reflects an emphasis on self-face defense and protection. This does not mean that Euro-Americans are not concerned about group or social face. On the contrary, group face is critical for members of particular groups (e.g., cults) that provide the predominant sense of identity and definition to the individual.
By comparison, Southeast Asians are principally motivated by a concern for a social/group face. Politeness and attention to the face needs of the other is of paramount importance in most all social interactions. It is this presumption of collective respect and consideration for both the social and other's face that enables successful and appropriate communication. Concern for social face is extremely strong as Southeast Asians rely on their group identity to provide a sense of self-definition. For example, in one incident a young Asian man stated that his father was dead, even though he was quite alive, because he had lost face in immigrating to the United States where he was essentially stripped of his social status. This does not preclude a concern for individual face for the Southeast Asian, but rather that each culture has a dominant frame for defining the self and for negotiating identity during social interaction.

Instrumental Concerns

One way to understand how different cultures address instrumental concerns is the manner in which people talk about issues and attempt to persuade another to accept their position. Euro-Americans characteristically engage in clear and direct language and expect the issue or problem to be forthrightly articulated. The expectation of Euro-Americans is that any discussion or debate over an issue

should be couched within well-developed reasoned argument. Verbal meaning is of paramount importance, such that one should always 'Say what you mean.' Comparatively, Southeast Asians communicate their concern about an issue indirectly, using vague and seemingly obtuse language (from a Euro-American point of view). The problem is not clearly stated, as Euro-Americans might prefer, but rather is implied to be understood by the nature of the situation and the parties involved. In this way, much of the definition for the event is linked to the context and the nature of the relationship between the individuals involved, not the verbal message. Attempts at persuasion are grounded in concerns for maintenance of social face and respect for each other's individual face. Finally, adherence to social norms is strongly emphasized as a means to facilitate behavioral compliance.

Relational Concerns

For Euro-Americans, when issues of contention arise, the expectation is to communicate in a problem-solving manner. In other words, if there is a problem, then we need to deal with it. And, in order to deal with the problem, we have to know the facts. As such, problem management dictates that each person involved clearly articulate his/her concerns. Consequently, communication in such interactions tends to be sender-focused as each person vies for personal power and respect for individual face needs. However, first names are often used, rather than each person's formal title, in an effort to emphasize the equalitarian nature of the interaction. The desire is to deal with the issues directly so that they might be resolved in a timely fashion. As a result, third parties are rarely employed to mediate the process as they reduce direct contact among conflicting parties, and tend to denote an individual weakness in being able to manage the situation. When dealing with a conflict, Southeast Asians, by comparison, tend to be more concerned about the maintenance of relational harmony than specifically dealing with the problem. In fact, concern for positive social relations prompts each individual involved in the situation to communicate in a manner that demonstrates a concern for the other person (a receiver-focused communication style) and less for self. Because relationships are the central component of all interactions, Southeast Asians tend to minimize the nature of the problem, and will even yield to the other person so as to reduce tensions and achieve relational calm. As Dr. Hammer and I discovered during a focus group discussion with several Southeast Asian, the older of the two persons may yield first in order to minimize possible conflict escalation. Among Southeast Asians relationships are hierarchically structured with an inherent inequality in power and social status. As such, individual titles and special language may be used depending upon the context and the status of the parties involved. Further, conflicts tend to be managed indirectly and formally, based on the nature of the interactants' relationship.

Consequently, third parties are frequently used as a means to ensure formal resolution procedures and to allow both parties to save face.

Emotion Concerns

When dealing with emotions, Euro-Americans are generally expressive of individual feelings. Whether it be anger or joy, happiness or sadness, love or hate, Euro-Americans tend to wear their emotions on their sleeves. Ironically, one way to keep strong emotions in check during a conflict is to vent extremely negatively intense emotions. For once venting has occurred – all feelings have been aired – then the two parties can get down to the business of solving the problem in an emotionally controlled manner. Additionally, venting allows each party the opportunity to express his/her true feelings. In order to achieve resolution, both parties must actively engage in dialogue. In fact, as long as both parties are talking, then there is a sense that they are making progress toward incident resolution. It is when conversation ends that Euro-Americans are concerned about potentially violent behavior.

Southeast Asians principally refrain from significant emotional expression in comparison with Euro-Americans. The general norm is one of emotional restraint. Briefly, individual emotional experiences should be contained and venting avoided as such behavior is regarded as impulsive and might result in an escalation of the problem. In this vein, when situations become highly charged it is often the case that conversation is curtailed to allow time for the respective parties to cool off. Continued talking may simply result in an escalation, or one party saying something that he/she will later regret. As Mitch and I discovered during our focus group sessions, taking a tea break is one way that parties can honorably take a break from negotiations and get their emotions in check.

As this discussion has demonstrated, the four elements of the F.I.R.E. model have cross-cultural application. Using the four dimensions as an analytic template can help inform negotiators about differences that exist between cultural groups. Such an understanding can help negotiators structure the negotiation process when faced with an intercultural encounter.

GENERAL GUIDELINES

In concluding, I want to offer several guidelines for negotiation that are based in the F.I.R.E. model. These guidelines derive from the analyses of actual incidents that Mitch Hammer and I have been doing for the past eight years. These are offered as analytic observations that we believe have implications for incident management.

- Conflict de-escalates when the negotiator's 'framing' of issues matches that of the perpetrator.
- Conflict de-escalates when the negotiator shifts 'frame' after achieving resolution of issues within the existing frame.
- One role of the second negotiator is to identify the perpetrator's 'frame' and monitor progress in addressing F.I.R.E. issues.
- An increase in non-substantive 'instrumental' demands reflects increasing conflict around relational issues.
- Substantive instrumental demands become more negotiable when trust is established between perpetrator and negotiator.
- Surrender is more likely when trust and affiliation increases.
- Surrender is more likely when the perpetrator's face issues are met.
- The role of the negotiator is to alter the perpetrator's emotional state from negative to positive.
- Unresolved power issues will increase the likelihood that the perpetrator will 'act out' aggressive impulses.

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IMPROVING CRISIS NEGOTIATION CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

Otto M.J. Adang

Introduction

The focus of the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations was on international aspects of crisis negotiation and the management of hostage incidents in a broad range of situations, including terrorist attacks, domestic crises, suicide attempts, criminal kidnaps and prison revolts. The participants exchanged information, discussed similarities and differences concerning hostage incidents and their management, identified training needs, innovative approaches and blockades to effective international co-operation. The conference was attended by 146 participants from 21 different nations (see table). Participants included researchers (14) and trainers (17), but the majority (almost 100) of the participants were hostage negotiators. Although some of them fulfil a co-ordinating or managerial function (apart from hostage negotiation) in their force, higher decision making levels and on-scene commanders were sparsely represented. As a result, the conclusions of the conference summarise practitioners' views on the ways in which international co-operation in crisis negotiations could be improved.

EU countries		**Other Countries**	
Austria	2	Australia	1
Belgium	10	Azerbeijan	1
Denmark	3	Chech republic	1
Finland	3	Hungary	4
France	2	Norway	4
Germany	28	Switzerland	1
Ireland	1	USA	1
Italy	1		
Luxembourg	2		
the Netherlands	54		
Portugal	1		
Spain	5		
Sweden	3		
United Kingdom	18		

Country of origin of participants to the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations

Evaluation of the conference

Analysis of the 100 evaluation forms that were filled out learns that the conference seems to have reached its goals to a considerable extent. On a scale from 1 to 5 participants gave the following scores:

1. The conference has helped me map and understand similarities and differences concerning hostage incidents and their management in different countries: score 4,1

2. The conference has helped to identify joint training needs for law enforcement personnel involved in hostage incidents: score 3,9

3. The conference has made a contribution to improve law-enforcement co-ordination between Member States of the European Union, especially in cross-border incidents: score 3,5

4. At the conference innovating approaches to the management of hostage incidents were discussed: score 3,0

5. The conference has provided me with the opportunity to exchange information and to learn from one another: score 4,3

The opinions as to when a second European conference on hostage negotiations would have to be held were almost balanced: 56% of participants stated it would have to be held in one year (or sooner!), 44% in two years. No one thought it should never again be held.

International aspects

There are many ways in which more than one country may become involved in crisis negotiations. Nationals from one country may be taken hostage in another country, nationals from one country may take hostages in another country, hostage takers may move hostages from one country to another, hostage takers may make demands (e.g. release of prisoners) to the government of another country or hostage takers may operate in different countries (e.g. for the delivery of a ransom). In several plenary lectures the specific complications of hostage situations with international aspects were presented.

Patrick Peereboom and Ivo Vereycken from the Belgian Special Intervention Unit belonging to the Gendarmerie held an informative presentation about the

kidnapping of an eight-year-old child. The wanted the ransom to be delivered in another country. International co-ordination, liasing with the parents and psychological support proved to be of utmost importance, as well as implementation of a consistent media strategy.

Mike Dixon from the Organised Crime Group of the Metropolitan Police gave a presentation about the UK response to the kidnapping of British nationals abroad. Since 1994 the UK government response is more pro-active, involving a multi agency approach inside and out of UK. There is growing inter-governmental co-ordination leading to police mutual assistance. Co-ordination is also stimulated by the International Convention against the taking of hostages (1980) and the recent G8 'agreements in principle'. Based on several case studies Dixon was able to identify elements of 'good practice'. These included:
- intergovernmental co-operation;
- internal close partnership between government and police;
- international police co-operation;
- agreement regarding hostage negotiation strategy;
- one voice to hostage takers;
- opposition to concessions;
- close liaison with families, NGOs and companies involved;
- joint media strategy.

Michael Ljungström from the Office of the United Nations Security Co-ordinator informed participants about a number of cases in which United Nations International Staff were kidnapped and about the United Nations Security Management System.

The UN train staff how to avoid becoming a hostage, how to survive as a hostage. The UN also trains designated officials and a security management team on how to manage a hostage incident. Ljungström was able to inform participants about lessons learnt from hostage takings of UN personnel in different countries. He indicated that it is essential that the government of the country concerned and not the UN negotiate, that the UN participate in the negotiation process to ensure the safety of the hostages, that UN staff have knowledge of the principle of hostage taking and that military are sensitised to needs of civilian colleagues. Ljungström stressed that co-ordination amongst all parties is critical, as is a good media strategy.

Best practices and areas for improvement

Based on a staged hostage-taking incident, participants divided into internationally composed subgroups to exchange information, to discuss best practices and to make suggestions for improvement. Aspects discussed included the organisation of crisis incidents: who is responsible for building up the crisis incident organisation, who is part of this organisation, at what moment and how will negotiators be contacted? Criteria for deployment of negotiators and the position of negotiators in the organisation, especially in relation with other specialised units within the police were talked about, as was the organisation of negotiation teams.

An important part of the information exchange dealt with when and how a neighbouring country or region would be informed of a possible cross-border incident development and about legal procedures involved. Participants informed each other about problems in co-ordinating cross-border incidents with regard to general crisis organisation, negotiation strategy, operational procedures and legal issues.

Some participants indicated that they did have knowledge of the approach of neighbouring countries and regions, but many would not know what the most important differences between their approach and the approach of their direct neighbours would be.

In the discussions, participants agreed on many aspects, especially on the evolving mission and methodology of crisis negotiation, on the fact that a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach is often necessary. Enhanced communication (use of fax and Internet by hostage takers) and terrorism were perceived by all as future threats. At a working level willingness and motivation to co-operate clearly existed.

The participants also identified several areas where countries differed. These differences included a different role of authorities and differences in legislation and police powers in different countries. With regard to crisis negotiations itself, important differences were found in the means of communication used and favoured, in the way negotiation was used (as an alternative to tactical solutions or just to make a tactical solution possible), in views on what is and is not negotiable (e.g. drugs) and whether negotiators always have to be honest. Finally, negotiators from different countries differed in the way they did or did not liase with private firms during incidents.

Participants identified several training needs. Generally a need was felt to learn more about the psychological background of hostage takers, about consequences of hostage takers or victims coming from another cultural or ethnic background and about the perception of hostage takers (and victims) of crisis negotiations. With regard to international co-operation, joint training was felt to be needed as well as more knowledge about treaties and relevant legal procedures.

European law-enforcement co-operation could be improved by making it more formal. Formal structures to be enhanced include bilateral co-operation between neighbouring countries and international co-operation at a practitioner's level. Guidelines for cross-border co-operation should be established and national legislation should be harmonised. An important action to improve co-operation would be the exchange of best practices.

In the course of the conference, participants discussed several innovative approaches to crisis negotiation. Not everyone agreed on the feasibility of so-called parallel negotiations, where a second team of negotiators has contact with a hostage taker. Questions were raised about the legality and about when to stop. All participants agreed that the skills of hostage negotiators could be used in a wider array of situations, e.g. talking to victims of disasters/ big fires, public order situations, etc. On the other hand, a need was felt to teach basis 'crisis communication' dos and don'ts to policemen who may be the first to respond to a crisis situation. All participants agreed that joint training and the inclusion of a foreign negotiator as adviser could greatly enhance the success of negotiations with international aspects.

The participants identified several problems and obstacles for a professional use of hostage negotiators in crises. The way in which negotiators are alarmed often depends on a list in the control room or on an individual commander and involvement of negotiators may be accidental rather than structural. The hierarchical position of negotiators is often lower than that of tactical commanders or negotiation is often less important in the crisis organisation. Both aspects tend to diminish the potential impact of negotiation.

Especially in relation to cross border incidents, differences in legislation, different interpretations of Schengen, differences in the way the police are organised and a lack of joint training may render co-operation difficult. As one participant put it: the criminals are networking, but we are not.
In incidents where borders are crossed, differences of opinion may arise as to where control lies. Strategic country control should remain in the country where the incident originated, and tactical control in the country where the incident is

actually taking place. In practice, tactic considerations may lead strategic decisions.

Language poses another problem in international incidents (or in incidents involving nationals originating from another country). Use of interpreters may be necessary, but interpreters are usually not trained in crisis situations, their trustworthiness may be a problem, and interpreters may become the objects of personal threats.

Many countries lack national co-ordination regarding crisis negotiation. In some countries there does not appear to be a problem (e.g. Belgium, Norway). Especially states consisting of relatively autonomous countries (e.g. Germany) or having relatively autonomous forces may experience problems with co-ordination within the state and co-ordination with other states. The United Kingdom with 43 regional forces has established a manageable structure with 8 regions, co-ordinated by Scotland Yard. During the conference negotiators from the Netherlands (26 regional forces) formed a national platform.

Recommendations

In a concluding plenary session chaired by Maarten de Jong from the Association for European Law Enforcement co-operation, the participants to the conference unanimously agreed on the following recommendations to improve crisis negotiation co-operation in Europe.

1. Publish conference proceedings. The organising committee agreed to do this.

2. Establish a working group of national co-ordinators. Representatives from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands would take the initiative to establish a European working group. Within countries, negotiators will develop means to establish national co-ordination.

3. Involve higher decision making levels. All participants agreed they had a task in this. Availability of the conference proceedings with the conclusions and recommendations of the conference was considered crucial.

4. Organise more exchange of information through:
   - establishing a bulletin board (without compromising the need for data protection);
   - making a directory of names, training opportunities and organisations involved;

- creating a database of incidents;
- regularly holding meetings on techniques, tactics and co-ordination. In these meetings incident commanders and and public prosecutors should be involved as well. It is vital to invite higher level decision makers, because negotiation is just one part of dealing with a problem.

Initiatives will be taken bilaterally. European initiatives will have to come from the working group of national co-ordinators to-be-established.

5. Organise more exchange of negotiators, especially through:
   - joint cross-border training (several initiatives have been taken already, e.g. between Norway and Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium);
   - ad hoc observations of negotiations by colleagues from abroad;
   - active participation in each other's exercises;
   - active participation as adviser or interpreter in negations.

Initiatives may be taken bilaterally. European initiatives will have to come from the working group of national co-ordinators to-be-established.

6. Start research projects, especially concerning:
   - differences in legal procedures;
   - crisis communication from the perspective of perpetrators, victims and relatives;
   - existing theoretical models and application of these models.

Researchers from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands agreed to make research proposals.

About the authors

Otto M.J. Adang is research manager at the Research and Development section of the LSOP Police Education and Knowledge Centre in Apeldoorn, the Netherlands. Otto is a behavioural scientist who wrote his Ph.D. thesis on the development of quasi-aggressive behaviour in chimpanzees. Between 1985 and 1990 he did research on the behaviour of people during critical public order incidents. From 1991 to 1998 he was attached as researcher and consultant to the Police Institute Public order and Safety in the Netherlands, where he co-ordinated research on bomb threats, public order policing, use of force and crisis management. He is author of numerous publications and was one of the organisers of the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations.
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Ellen Giebels is a research fellow at the University of Groningen and the Kurt Lewin Institute in Amsterdam, both in the Netherlands. She is currently completing her doctoral dissertation on the communicative dynamics of power processes in negotiation. Ellen authored and co-authored several journal articles on conflict management and negotiation. She has also conducted various training sessions in conflict management and negotiation. Ellen served on the 1998 program committee of the International Association for Conflict Management. She was also one of the organisers of the First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations. Since 1996 Ellen has been assisting the Dutch Police Institute Public order and Safety in the field of crisis negotiations. This includes consultation and research.
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In 1965 **Peter IJzerman** was a police officer in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Through Zwolle, he moved to the police in Enschede in 1978, where in 1986 he became Chief of Police. From 1992 to 1998 he was Chief of Police in Twente. Since January 1998, Peter IJzerman is the Managing Director of the LSOP Police Education and Knowledge Centre in Apeldoorn, the Netherlands. The LSOP takes care of the training, selection, research, and consultancy for the Dutch police.
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David Veness joined the Metropolitan Police in 1966 and became a Detective in 1969, serving in various ranks in East, North and Central London and with many Specialist Departments at New Scotland Yard. David was trained as a Hostage Negotiator in 1979 and as a Detective Chief Superintendent became the Director of National Hostage Negotiator Training in the UK. He has negotiated at numerous incidents the most notable being the Iranian Embassy Siege in April 1980. He was appointed Commander in 1987, and in November 1991 he was promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'Specialist Operations' taking command of specialist branches at New Scotland Yard. Appointed Assistant Commissioner in 1994, he assumed charge of all Specialist Operations inclu▾ding Protection, Terrorism, Intelligence, and Organised Crime.
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Randall Rogan is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at Wake Forest University, USA. He has conducted research and analyses of the communicative dynamics of crisis negotiation incidents for the past eight years. He is also engaged in the affective and cultural analysis of threatening communications. His most recent work has appeared in Human Communication Research, Applied Communication Research, Communication Reports, The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, and the Police Chief.
He is editor (together with Mitchell Hammer and Clinton Van Zandt) of the recently published book Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiation: Theory, Research and Practice as well as co-authoring (with Hammer and Van Zandt) the forthcoming book Crisis Negotiations: Case Studies of Hostage Incidents.
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Conference programme

First European Conference on Hostage Negotiations

November 24-25, 1998

24th November 1998

Introduction: Maarten de Jong, chairman

09.00 – 09.15	Welcome by Peter IJzerman
09.15 – 09.45	Opening by David Veness
09.45 – 10.30	Presentation results Hostage Negotiation Inventory by Ellen Giebels
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee Break
11.00 – 11.45	Case presentation by Ivo Vereijken and Patrick Peereboom
12.00 – 01.00	Lunch
01.00 – 03.30	Introduction subtracks: general philosophy & strategies/tactics
03.30 – 04.15	Presentation by Randall Rogan
04.15 – 06.15	Subtracks: Cross-border complication-organisational focus
06.30 – 08.30	Conference buffet

25th November 1998

09.00 – 10.00	Conclusions day 1 & program day 2 by Maarten de Jong and panel
10.00 – 10.45	Case presentation Metropolitan Police by Mike Dixon
10.45 – 11.15	Coffee break
11.15 – 12.00	Presentation UN approach to hostage incidents by Michael Ljungström
12.00 – 01.00	Lunch
01.00 – 03.00	Main conclusions, bottlenecks and recommendations
03.00 – 03.30	Coffee break
03.30 – 04.30	Plenary feedback session and conference closing by Maarten de Jong

The OISIN program of the European Union

In 1996 the Council of the European Union adopted the OISIN programme, a framework to develop and enhance co-operation between police, customs, and other law enforcement authorities of Member States and to provide such authorities with greater insight into the working methods of their counterparts in other Member States.
What the OISIN programme sets out to do is to stimulate and enhance dynamic webs of relations among law enforcement authorities throughout the European Union by providing a framework for the exchange and training of, and co-operation between the law enforcement authorities. This with a view to enhancing practical co-operation between law enforcement authorities and to contributing to an increase in mutual knowledge and understanding of the legal systems and law enforcement practices of the Member States and to raise the level of expertise of law enforcement personnel of the Member States.

The criteria on which projects are selected for financing are as follows:
- the European dimension of the project;
- the consistency of the topics to be covered with the work undertaken in Council action programmes coming under police and custom co-operation;
- the operational purpose and practical input, i.e. the extent to which stress is placed in passing on knowledge of use in carrying on the professional activity concerned, without overlooking the need for a thorough consideration of the obstacles to co-operation;
- the number and the degree of preparation of law enforcement officers likely to derive some advantage from the project either directly or through contact between those who have participated and those who have not;
- partnership in the organisation of the project and, openness to law enforcement personnel from different countries and different fields;
- the extent to which the project contributes to creating a forward momentum.

A report has to be provided to the European Union on the execution of the project, any obstacles encountered, the assessment given by the participants, the results obtained, the dissemination of such results and the conclusions drawn.